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Abstract—The application of physical layer security in ad hoc
networks has attracted considerable academic attention recently.
However, the available studies mainly focus on the single-hop
and two-hop network scenarios, and the price in terms of
degradation of communication quality of service (QoS) caused by
improving security is largely uninvestigated. As a step to address
these issues, this paper explores the physical layer security-
aware routing and performance tradeoffs in a multi-hop ad
hoc network. Specifically, for any given end-to-end path we
first derive its connection outage probability (COP) and secrecy
outage probability (SOP) in closed-form, which serve as the
performance metrics of communication QoS and transmission
security, respectively. Based on the closed-form expressions, we
then study the security-QoS tradeoffs to minimize COP (resp.
SOP) conditioned on that SOP (resp. COP) is guaranteed. With
the help of analysis of a given path, we further propose the
routing algorithms which can achieve the optimal performance
tradeoffs for any pair of source and destination nodes in a
distributed manner. Finally, simulation and numerical results are
presented to validate the efficiency of our theoretical analysis, as
well as to illustrate the security-QoS tradeoffs and the routing
performance.
Index Terms—Ad hoc networks, physical layer security, QoS,
routing.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Related Works
The ad hoc network represents a class of self-organizing
network architecture, which consists of nodes communicating
with each other over peer-to-peer wireless channels without
centralized infrastructure [1]. Since ad hoc networks can be
flexibly deployed and reconfigured at very low cost, they are
highly promising for many critical applications, such as disas-
ter relief, emergency rescue, daily information exchange, traf-
fic off-loading and coverage extension for 5G cellular networks
[2], [3]. To facilitate the application and commercialization of
ad hoc networks, protecting their transmission security is of
great significance [4]. However, due to the broadcast nature
of wireless channel and the lack of central administration,
it is very challenging for the traditional cryptographic-based
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security techniques [5] to be applied in such a distributed ad
hoc network.
As a complementary technique of cryptographic-based
methods, physical layer security, an information-theoretic ap-
proach which exploits the fundamental characteristics of wire-
less channel to achieve perfect secrecy, has been extensively
studied over the past few decades. Based on the results of
Shannon in [6], Wyner first indicated that perfect secrecy
is achievable when the condition of main channel between
transmitter and receiver is better than that of wiretap channel
between transmitter and eavesdropper [7]. Following this line,
many research activities have been devoted to the study of
physical layer security under various channel models, such
as the broadcast channel [8], Gaussian wiretap channel [9],
two-way wiretap channel [10], multi-access channel [11] and
MIMO wiretap channel [12]. Meanwhile, diverse approaches
for improving physical layer security have been proposed
in the literature. The works of [13]–[19] demonstrated that
the strategies of cooperative jamming and relay selection can
be utilized to enhance physical layer security. The works
of [20], [21] indicated that physical layer security can also
be facilitated by applying coding schemes. Moreover, the
combinations of physical layer security with other techniques
such as power allocation, signal processing, and cross-layer
optimization were explored in [22], [23] and [24], respectively.
Since physical layer security has the advantage of low
computational complexity and can be easily implemented
in a distributed manner, its application in ad hoc networks
has attracted considerable academic attention recently [25]–
[33]. For a large-scale ad hoc network, Vasudevan et al.
[25] investigated the asymptotic behaviors of security-capacity
tradeoff as the number of network nodes tends to infinity.
The price in terms of performance degradation for ensuring
physical layer security in ad hoc networks was explored under
the large-scale network scenario [26] and single-hop network
scenario [27], respectively. Goeckel et al. [28] indicated that
the artificial noise generated by cooperative relays can be
utilized to achieve everlasting secrecy in a two-hop ad hoc
network. Koyluoglu et al. [29] studied the scaling behaviors of
ad hoc networks under secrecy constraints. They demonstrated
that under the path loss model, a secure rate of Ω( 1√
n
)
is achievable if the density of eavesdropper is below some
threshold1; while under the ergodic fading model, a constant
secret rate can be achieved for sufficiently large n. For a
two-hop relay ad hoc network, Zou et al. [30] explored the
1n is the number of source-destination pairs and please kindly refer to [34]
for the asymptotic notations.
2cooperative-based relay selection schemes to improve trans-
mission security against eavesdropping attack. Xie and Ulukus
[31] considered the single-hop ad hoc network with four
fundamental wireless channels, and studied its secure degrees
of freedom as well as provided the corresponding achievable
schemes. Duy et al. [32] evaluated the secrecy performance of
a two-hop cooperative relay network under the impact of co-
channel interference and proposed an optimal relay selection
scheme to maximize the secrecy capacity. Karas et al. [33]
derived the closed-form expressions for SOP in a single-
hop cellular system with the consideration of eavesdropper’s
location uncertainty. For a detailed survey on physical layer
security and its applications in ad hoc networks, please kindly
refer to [35] and references therein.
B. Motivation and Our Contributions
Although there have been extensive works for studying
physical layer security in wireless networks, they mainly focus
on either the single-hop and two-hop network scenarios, or the
asymptotic large-scale network scenarios, while the research
of physical layer security in multi-hop ad hoc networks
which fills the significant gap between those two extremes
is largely untouched and thus remains a technical challenge.
By now, some initial results have been reported on the study
of physical layer security in multi-hop ad hoc networks [36]–
[39]. Specifically, Saad et al. [36] proposed a tree-formation
game to choose secure paths in multi-hop ad hoc networks.
Later, Ghaderi et al. [37] explored the minimum energy
routing which can guarantee security for multi-hop ad hoc
networks. More recently, Yao et al. [38] studied the physical
layer security-based routing in multi-hop ad hoc networks
with decode-and-forward relaying, and Lee [39] proposed an
optimal power allocation strategy for maximizing the secrecy
rate in a special multi-hop relay network with single source-
destination pair.
It is notable that security usually comes with a cost in
terms of performance degradation [26], [27], thus the tradeoffs
between security and other network performance should be
carefully addressed for a practical multi-hop ad hoc net-
work. In [40], [41] and our previous work [42], the issue
of integrating security and quality of service (QoS) under
some network scenarios was investigated. In [43], [44], the
security-reliability tradeoff was explored in cooperative relay
networks and cognitive radio systems, respectively, where the
two-hop network scenarios were considered and corresponding
optimal relay selection schemes were proposed. While in this
paper, for the first time, we explore the tradeoffs between
transmission security and communication QoS in a multi-
hop ad hoc network. We consider a general multi-hop ad
hoc network with randomly distributed legitimate nodes, co-
operative jammers and malicious eavesdroppers, and analyze
the connection outage probability (COP) and secrecy outage
probability (SOP) for a given path. Based on the outage
probability analysis, we study the COP and SOP tradeoffs, and
further propose the routing algorithms which can achieve the
optimal performance with the guaranteed communication QoS
and transmission security in the concerned ad hoc network.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• For any given end-to-end path in a general multi-hop ad
hoc network where jammers and malicious eavesdrop-
pers are randomly distributed following the independent
Poisson point processes, we derive its COP and SOP in
closed-form, which serve as the performance metrics of
communication QoS and transmission security, respec-
tively.
• We formulate the security-QoS tradeoffs of a given path
as two constrained optimization problems and provide
corresponding analysis to obtain the optimal solutions.
Based on the results of a given path, we further propose
the routing algorithms which can find the optimal path
between any pair of source and destination nodes, and
allocate transmission power for each node on the path to
achieve the optimal performance.
• We provide extensive simulation and numerical results
to validate the efficiency of our theoretical analysis,
and illustrate the security-QoS tradeoffs as well as the
performance of proposed routing algorithms.
C. Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the preliminaries involved in this paper. The
expressions of COP and SOP are derived in Section III. We
explore the tradeoffs between COP and SOP in Section IV
and propose the routing algorithms in Section V. Finally,
Section VI presents the simulation and numerical results, and
Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the network model, wireless
channel model and performance metrics involved in this study.
A. Network Model
Following the network model in [37], we consider a general
multi-hop ad hoc network which consists of arbitrarily dis-
tributed legitimate nodes, cooperative jammers and malicious
eavesdroppers. A K-hop path (route) Π = 〈l1, . . . , lK〉 in the
network is formed by K links from l1 to lK , and a link lk ∈ Π
connects two legitimate nodes Sk and Dk on path Π. We
assume that each link lk is exposed to a set of eavesdroppers
denoted by ΦE = {Ei, i = 1, 2, . . .}. The locations of eaves-
droppers are unknown since they usually work in a passive
way. In order to statistically evaluate the network performance,
an independent homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP)
[27], [37], [38] with density λE is applied to characterize
the distributions of eavesdroppers’ locations. Furthermore, we
assume that whenever a legitimate node Sk transmits a mes-
sage, a set of external nodes ΦJ = {Jj , j = 1, 2, . . .}, called
jammers, cooperate with the legitimate node by jamming the
message at eavesdroppers. The locations of jammers also
follow an independent homogeneous PPP with density λJ and
the transmission power of each jammer is the same, denoted
by PJ¯ .
3B. Wireless Channel Model
We consider the decode-and-forward (DF) relaying scheme
and assume that the instantaneous wireless channel state
between any pair of nodes is unavailable but can be statistically
characterized by the large-scale path loss along with the small-
scale Rayleigh fading [30], [37], [45], [46]. We also apply the
randomization strategy widely used in other works [17], [29],
[37], with which each link transmits independent random-
ization signal such that eavesdroppers cannot use combining
techniques to combine the received signals from multiple
hops. In addition, we assume that the network is interference-
limited and thus the noise at the receiver is negligible [27].
The reason of adopting interference-limited assumption is that
the mathematical tractability of this assumption allows us to
gain important insights into the security-QoS tradeoffs and
routing protocol design in ad hoc networks, as shown in later
context. More formally, regarding a transmission from node S
to node D, let PS denote the transmission power of S, xS and
xJj denote the normalized (unit power) symbol stream to be
transmitted by S and its jth jammer Jj , respectively, and yD
denote the received signal at D. Then yD can be expressed
as2:
yD =
√
PShS,D
d
α/2
S,D
xS +
∑
Jj∈ΦJ
√
PJ¯hJj ,D
d
α/2
Jj ,D
xJj , (1)
where dS,D and hS,D (resp. dJj ,D and hJj ,D) are the distance
and the fading coefficient of wireless channel between S (resp.
Jj) and D, α is the path-loss exponent (typically between 2
and 6), |hS,D|2 (resp. |hJj ,D|2) is exponentially distributed
with E{|hS,D|2} = 1 (resp. E{|hJj,D|2} = 1). Similarly, for
an eavesdropper E ∈ ΦE , the signal yE received at E is given
by
yE =
√
PShS,E
d
α/2
S,E
xS +
∑
Jj∈ΦJ
√
PJ¯hJj ,E
d
α/2
Jj ,E
xJj , (2)
where dS,E and hS,E (resp. dJj ,E and hJj,E) are the distance
and the fading coefficient of wiretap link between S (resp.
Jj) and E, |hS,E|2 (resp. |hJj ,E |2) is exponentially distributed
with E{|hS,E|2} = 1 (resp. E{|hJj ,E |2} = 1).
C. Performance Metrics
Following the definitions in [27], [37], the performance
metrics involved in this paper are defined as follows:
Connection Outage Probability: The event of connection
outage refers to the case when the signal-to-interference ratio
(SIR) at the intended receiver is below a required threshold
γC , such that the message cannot be correctly decoded by
the receiver. The connection outage probability (COP) Pco is
defined as the probability that the event of connection outage
happens.
Secrecy Outage Probability: The event of secrecy outage
refers to the case when the SIR at one or more eavesdroppers
is above a required threshold γE , such that the message
can be decoded by the eavesdropper(s). The secrecy outage
2We don’t consider mutual interference between legitimate links since it
can be avoided by mature media access control techniques.
probability (SOP) Pso is defined as the probability that the
event of secrecy outage happens.
Notice that in Wyner’s encoding scheme [7], [27], the trans-
mitter chooses two rates, the rate of transmitted codewords
Rt and the rate of the confidential messages Rs. The rate
difference Re = Rt − Rs reflects the cost of securing the
messages against the eavesdroppers. If the legitimate channel
capacity is less than Rt, the connection outage happens.
While if the wiretap channel capacity is higher than Re, the
secrecy outage happens. According to Shannon’s Theorem,
the channel capacity is determined by the corresponding SIR
at the receiver. Thus, our performance metrics can be easily
mapped to those based on Wyner’s encoding scheme [7], [14],
[17], where the conversions between the SIR thresholds and
the code rates are γC = 2
Rt − 1 and γE = 2Re − 1, and
the results in this paper also applies to the Wyner’s encoding
scheme.
Remark 1: The performance metrics COP and SOP are
equivalent to the metrics outage probability (OP) and intercept
probability (IP) defined in [43], [44] by applying Shannon’s
Theorem, respectively. Following the statement in [43], [44],
COP and SOP are of high significance as COP represents the
communication QoS of a network user, while SOP serves as
a measure of the transmission security level.
III. OUTAGE PROBABILITIES ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive the exact expressions of COP
and SOP for a given path, which will help us explore the
performance tradeoffs in Section IV.
A. COP Analysis
Regarding the COP of a given path, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 1: For a concerned ad hoc network with the network
model and wireless channel model as described in Section II,
the COP of a K-hop path Π = 〈l1, . . . , lK〉 is given by
Pco(Π) = 1− exp
(
−Aco
∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,DkP
− 2
α
Sk
)
, (3)
where Aco = λJπ (γCPJ¯ )
2
α Γ(1 − 2α )Γ(1 + 2α ), Γ(·) is a
gamma function, PSk denote the transmission power of Sk.
Proof: We first derive the COP for a link lk on path Π,
which is termed as Pco(lk). Based on the wireless channel
model of Expression (1) and the definition of COP, Pco(lk)
can be determined as:
Pco(lk) = P
{
PSk |hSk,Dk |2/dαSk,Dk∑
Jj∈ΦJ PJ¯ |hJj ,Dk |2/dαJj,Dk
< γC
}
, (4)
which can be further rewritten as (5), shown at the top of the
next page.
4Pco(lk) = 1− EΦJ
{
EhJj,Dk
{
exp
(−γC∑Jj∈ΦJ PJ¯ |hJj ,Dk |2/dαJj,Dk
PSk/d
α
Sk,Dk
)}}
= 1− EΦJ


∏
Jj∈ΦJ
EhJj ,Dk
{
exp
(
−γCPJ¯ |hJj,Dk |2/dαJj,Dk
PSk/d
α
Sk,Dk
)}

= 1− EΦJ


∏
Jj∈ΦJ
{∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−
(
γCPJ¯/d
α
Jj ,D
PSk/d
α
Sk,Dk
+ 1
)
x
]
dx
}

= 1− EΦJ


∏
Jj∈ΦJ
1
1 +
γCPJ¯/d
α
Jj,Dk
PSk/d
α
Sk,Dk

 . (5)
Notice that for a homogeneous PPP, the corresponding
probability generating functional (PGFL) is given by [47]
EΦJ


∏
Jj∈ΦJ
f(zJj)

 = exp
[
−λJ
∫
R2
1− f(zJj )dzJj
]
= exp
[
−2πλJ
∫ ∞
0
(1− f(r))rdr
]
,
(6)
where zJj is the location of Jj . By applying PGFL in (5),
then Pco(lk) can be expressed as:
Pco(lk) = 1− exp

−2πλJ
∫ ∞
0

 1
1 +
PSk/d
α
Sk,Dk
γCPJ¯/r
α

 rdr


= 1− exp
(
−Acod2Sk,DkP
− 2
α
Sk
)
. (7)
Due to the randomization strategy, each legitimate receiver
can only decode the signal of each hop individually according
to the link SIR. Therefore, based on the COP of a link lk, the
COP Pco(Π) of the K-hop path Π can be finally determined
as:
Pco(Π) = 1−
∏
lk∈Π
[1− Pco(lk)] (8)
= 1− exp
(
−Aco
∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,DkP
− 2
α
Sk
)
.
We can see from Formula (3) that Pco(Π) is an increasing
function of λJ , PJ¯ and γC , while being a decreasing function
of PSk .
B. SOP Analysis
Regarding the SOP of a given path, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 2: For a concerned ad hoc network with the network
model and wireless channel model as described in Section II,
the SOP of a K-hop path Π = 〈l1, . . . , lK〉 is given by
Pso(Π) = 1− exp
(
−Bso
∑
lk∈Π
P
2
α
Sk
)
, (9)
where Bso =
λE
λJ
[
(γEPJ¯ )
2
α Γ(1− 2
α
)Γ(1 +
2
α
)
]−1
.
Proof: We first derive the SOP for a link lk on path Π,
which is termed as Pso(lk). Based on the wireless channel
model of Expression (2) and the definition of SOP, Pso(lk)
can be determined as (10), shown at the top of the next page.
Applying the PGFL technique for the PPP ΦE , then Equation
(10) can be re-expressed as (14), shown at the top of the next
page, where (12) follows from the Jensen’s inequality, and
(13) follows from the same procedures which transform (4)
into (7).
Due to the randomization strategy, each eavesdropper can
only decode the signal of each hop individually according to
the eavesdropping link SIR. Therefore, based on the SOP of a
link lk, the SOP Pso(Π) of the K-hop path Π can be finally
determined as:
Pso(Π) = 1−
∏
lk∈Π
[1− Pso(lk)] (15)
= 1− exp
(
−Bso
∑
lk∈Π
P
2
α
Sk
)
.
We can see from Formula (9) that Pso(Π) is an increasing
function of PSk and λE , while being a decreasing function
of γE , λJ and PJ¯ . It is notable that the statistical properties
of the locations of eavesdroppers and jammers as well as the
corresponding channel states have been carefully incorporated
into the derivations of COP and SOP.
Remark 2: For a given ad hoc network, the network pa-
rameters λJ , PJ¯ , γC , λE and γE are usually pre-determined,
the controllable parameter is the transmission power of each
transmitter. It is worth noting that increasing PSk will lead to
a decrease in Pco(Π) and an increase in Pso(Π), which agrees
with the intuition that a larger transmission power can bring
about a larger SIR at the intended receiver to gain a lower
COP, at the same time it comes with the cost of a higher SOP
since there is also a larger SIR at the eavesdroppers. This
observation indicates that by adjusting the transmission power
of each transmitter on path Π, we can achieve performance
tradeoffs between COP and SOP.
Since the performance tradeoffs between COP and SOP
exist, a problem of insight is how to optimize (minimize) one
5Pso(lk)=1−EΦJ

EΦE


∏
Ei∈ΦE

1−P


PSk |hSk,Ei |2/dαSk,Ei∑
Jj∈ΦJ
PJ¯ |hJj,Ei |2/dαJj,Ei
>γE
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ΦE ,ΦJ







 . (10)
Pso(lk) = 1− EΦJ
{
exp
{
−λE
∫
R2
P
{
PSk |hSk,Ei|2/dαSk,Ei∑
Jj∈ΦJ PJ¯ |hJj ,Ei |2/dαJj ,Ei
> γE
∣∣∣∣∣ΦJ
}
dzEi
}}
(11)
≤ 1− exp
{
−λE
∫
R2
P
{
PSk |hSk,Ei |2/dαSk,Ei∑
Jj∈ΦJ PJ¯ |hJj,Ei |2/dαJj ,Ei
> γE
}
dzEi
}
(12)
= 1− exp
{
−λE
∫
R2
exp
[
−λJπd2Sk,Ei
(
γE
PJ¯
PSk
) 2
α
Γ(1− 2
α
)Γ(1 +
2
α
)
]
dzEi
}
(13)
= 1− exp
{
−2πλE
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−λJπr2
(
γE
PJ¯
PSk
) 2
α
Γ(1 − 2
α
)Γ(1 +
2
α
)
]
rdr
}
= 1− exp
(
−BsoP
2
α
Sk
)
, (14)
outage probability while ensuring that another outage prob-
ability is below some pre-specified threshold. This problem
is termed as the optimal performance tradeoffs and will be
analyzed in the next section.
IV. OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE TRADEOFFS
In this section, we formally define the optimal performance
tradeoffs as the problems of secure-based optimal COP (SO-
COP) and QoS-based optimal SOP (QO-SOP), and provide
corresponding solutions, respectively.
A. SO-COP: Secure-based Optimal COP
We first analyze how to achieve optimal QoS performance
(minimal COP) conditioned on that secure performance is
ensured (SOP is below some pre-specified threshold), which
is termed as the problem SO-COP.
Let βso (0 < βso < 1) denote the pre-specified constraint
on SOP of path Π, then the problem SO-COP can be formally
defined as the following optimization issue:
min
lk∈Π,PSk
Pco(Π) (16)
s.t. Pso(Π) ≤ βso. (17)
Regarding the problem SO-COP (16)-(17), we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: For a concerned multi-hop ad hoc network,
where the densities of eavesdroppers and jammers are λE and
λJ , respectively, the required SIRs for an intended receiver
correctly decoding the message and an eavesdropper success-
fully intercepting the message are γC and γE , respectively, the
constraint on transmission security is βso, then the optimal
solution (i.e., optimal transmission power) of problem SO-
COP is determined as:
P SO-COPSk =

− ln(1− βso)
Bso
· dSk,Dk∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk


α/2
, lk ∈ Π,
(18)
and the optimal achievable COP with the guaranteed SOP is
given by
P ∗co(Π) = 1− exp

 λEπ
ln(1− βso)
(
γC
γE
) 2
α
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2.
(19)
Proof: Let Fk = P
2/α
Sk
, then Pco(Π) in Formula (3) and
Pso(Π) in Formula (9) can be re-expressed as:
Pco(Π) = 1− exp
(
−Aco
∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,Dk
Fk
)
, (20)
Pso(Π) = 1− exp
(
−Bso
∑
lk∈Π
Fk
)
. (21)
Substituting (21) into (17), we have
∑
lk∈Π
Fk ≤ − ln(1 − βso)
Bso
, ǫso. (22)
Notice that Pco(Π) in (20) is a decreasing function of Fk
while the objective in (16) is to minimize Pco(Π), so the
inequality constraint (22) can be replaced by the equality
constraint
∑
lk∈Π
Fk = ǫso. Therefore, the problem SO-COP is
6equivalent to the following optimization issue3:
min
lk∈Π,Fk
∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,Dk
Fk
(23)
s.t.
∑
lk∈Π
Fk = ǫso. (24)
To solve the above optimization issue, we apply the method
of Lagrange multipliers [48]. Then, we obtain the following
K equations:
∂
∂Fk
{∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,Dk
Fk
+ θ1
(∑
lk∈Π
Fk − ǫso
)} ∣∣∣∣∣
F∗
k
= 0,
lk ∈ Π,
(25)
where θ1 is the Lagrange multiplier, and we have
− d
2
Sk,Dk
(F ∗k )
2
+ θ1 = 0, lk ∈ Π,
⇒F ∗k =
1√
θ1
dSk,Dk , lk ∈ Π. (26)
Substituting (26) into (24), θ1 can be determined as:
θ1 =
(
1
ǫso
∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2
. (27)
Substituting (27) into (26), we have
F ∗k = ǫso
dSk,Dk∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
, lk ∈ Π. (28)
Thus, the optimal transmission power P SO-COPSk of node Sk is
given by
P SO-COPSk =

− ln(1 − βso)
Bso
· dSk,Dk∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk


α/2
,
and the minimum COP P ∗co(Π) of path Π under the condition
that Pso(Π) ≤ βso is determined as:
P ∗co(Π) = 1− exp
(
−Aco
∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,Dk
F ∗k
)
= 1− exp

−Aco 1
ǫso
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2
= 1− exp

 Aco ·Bso
ln(1− βso)
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2
= 1− exp

 λEπ
ln(1− βso)
(
γC
γE
) 2
α
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2 .
We can see from Formula (18) that P SO-COPSk is an increasing
function of λJ , PJ¯ , γE and βso, while being a decreasing
3We can see from this optimization issue that except the transmission power
PSk of each link is variable, the distance dSk,Dk is fixed and other quantities
are known in a statistical perspective of view.
function of λE . We can see from Formula (19) that P
∗
co(Π) is
an increasing function of γC and λE , while being a decreasing
function of γE and βso.
B. QO-SOP: QoS-based Optimal SOP
We then analyze how to achieve optimal secure performance
(minimal SOP) conditioned on that QoS performance is en-
sured (COP is below some pre-specified threshold), which is
termed as the problem QO-SOP.
Let βco (0 < βco < 1) denote the pre-specified constraint
on COP of path Π, then the problem QO-SOP can be formally
defined as the following optimization problem:
min
lk∈Π,PSk
Pso(Π) (29)
s.t. Pco(Π) ≤ βco. (30)
Regarding the problem QO-SOP (29)-(30), we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 2: For a given multi-hop ad hoc network, where
the densities of eavesdroppers and jammers are λE and λJ ,
respectively, the required SIRs for an intended receiver cor-
rectly decoding the message and an eavesdropper successfully
intercepting the message are γC and γE , respectively, the
constraint on communication QoS is βco, then the optimal
solution (i.e., optimal transmission power) of problem QO-
SOP is determined as:
PQO-COPSk =
[
− Aco
ln(1− βco) ·
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)
· dSk,Dk
]α/2
,
lk ∈ Π,
(31)
and the optimal achievable SOP with the guaranteed COP is
given by
P ∗so(Π) = 1− exp

 λEπ
ln(1 − βco)
(
γC
γE
) 2
α
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2 .
(32)
Proof: Let Fk = P
2/α
Sk
, then Pco(Π) and Pso(Π) can be
expressed as (20) and (21), respectively. Substituting (20) into
(30) we have
∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,Dk
Fk
≤ − ln(1− βco)
Aco
, ǫco. (33)
Notice that Pso(Π) in (21) is an increasing function of Fk
while the objective in (29) is to minimize Pso(Π), so the
inequality constraint (33) can be replaced by the equality
constraint
∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,Dk
Fk
= ǫco. Therefore, the problem QO-SOP
is equivalent to the following optimization issue:
min
lk∈Π,Fk
∑
lk∈Π
Fk (34)
s.t.
∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,Dk
Fk
= ǫco. (35)
7Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we also apply the method
of Lagrange multipliers and obtain the following K equations:
∂
∂Fk
{∑
lk∈Π
Fk + θ2
(∑
lk∈Π
d2Sk,Dk
Fk
− ǫco
)}
= 0,
∣∣∣∣∣
F∗
k
= 0,
lk ∈ Π,
(36)
where θ2 is the Lagrange multiplier. Then we have
1− θ2
d2Sk,Dk
(F ∗k )
2
= 0, lk ∈ Π,
⇒F ∗k =
√
θ2dSk,Dk , lk ∈ Π. (37)
Substituting (37) into (35), θ2 can be determined as:
θ2 =
(
1
ǫco
∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2
. (38)
Substituting (38) into (37), we have
F ∗k =
1
ǫco
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)
dSk,Dk , lk ∈ Π. (39)
Thus, the optimal transmission power PQO-SOPSk of node Sk is
given by
PQO-SOPSk =
[
− Aco
ln(1− βco) ·
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)
· dSk,Dk
]α/2
,
and the minimum SOP P ∗so(Π) of path Π under the condition
that Pco(Π) ≤ βco is determined as:
P ∗so(Π) = 1− exp
(
−Bso
∑
lk∈Π
F ∗k
)
= 1− exp

−Bso 1
ǫco
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2
= 1− exp

 Bso ·Aco
ln(1 − βso)
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2
= 1− exp

 λEπ
ln(1 − βco)
(
γC
γE
) 2
α
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2 .
We can see from Formula (31) that PQO-SOPSk is an increasing
function of λJ , PJ¯ and γC , while being a decreasing function
of βco. We can see from Formula (32) that P
∗
so(Π) is an
increasing function of γC and λE , while being a decreasing
function of γE and βco. Furthermore, our results indicate
that the jammer-related parameters λJ and PJ¯ have impacts
on Pco(Π) and Pso(Π), while have no impact on P
∗
co(Π)
and P ∗so(Π). This is in accordance with the intuition that
jammers have opposite effects on COP and SOP, and for the
performance tradeoffs the effects on two sides cancel each
other out.
V. ROUTING ALGORITHM
In Section III, we have derived the expressions of outage
probabilities for a given path, and in Section IV, we have
explored the optimal performance tradeoffs for a given path.
Based on the obtained results, in this section, we further
investigate the routing problem, i.e., for a pair of source and
destination nodes with multiple optional end-to-end paths, how
to select the optimal path to achieve the minimum COP under
the security constraint or the minimum SOP under the QoS
constraint.
A. Routing Algorithm for SO-COP
We first consider the routing algorithm for SO-COP. Based
on Formula (19), the routing problem of finding the optimal
path which achieves the minimum COP under the security
constraint can be expressed as:
min
Π∈S(Π)
1− exp

 λEπ
ln(1− βso)
(
γC
γE
) 2
α
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2,
(40)
where S(Π) denotes the set of all potential paths connecting
the pair of source and destination nodes. Then (40) is equiv-
alent to
min
Π∈S(Π)
∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk . (41)
Expression (41) indicates that the routing problem for SO-
COP is equivalent to finding the shortest path connecting
the pair of source and destination nodes. It means that we
can assign the link weights dSk,Dk to each potential link
lk and then find the path Π
∗ with the minimum total link
weights. This problem can be directly solved by Bellman-
Ford algorithm or Dijkstra’s algorithm [49], which returns the
shortest paths from a source vertex to all other vertexes in a
weighted graph. The computational complexity of Bellman-
Ford algorithm is O(N3), while for Dijkstra’s algorithm, it is
O(N2), N is the number of network nodes. However, Dijk-
stra’s algorithm requires all link states in the whole network,
while Bellman-Ford algorithm only needs the distance vectors
between neighboring nodes such that it can be easily realized
in a distributed ad hoc network based on the distance vector
approach [49].
The distributed Bellman-Ford algorithm (i.e., the distance
vector approach) does not take security-QoS tradeoffs into
consideration. Thus, after finding the shortest path Π∗, the
routing algorithm for SO-COP should conduct the transmis-
sion power allocation for each node on path Π∗ (except the
destination) based on Formula (18), which is another key
procedure to achieve the optimal COP with a guaranteed SOP.
It is notable that the computational complexity of proposed
algorithm is dominated by the shortest path finding procedure,
thus it has the same level of computational complexity as
Bellman-Ford algorithm, i.e., O(N3). It is polynomial and
much lower than that of the exhaustive search whose com-
plexity is O((N − 2)!). The details of routing algorithm for
SO-COP are summarized in Algorithm 1.
8Algorithm 1 Routing algorithm for SO-COP.
Input: Network parameters {λJ , λE , γC , γE , PJ¯ , α} and se-
curity constraint βso;
Output: The optimal path Π∗ for SO-COP, the correspond-
ing transmission power P SO-COPSk , the achievable COP
P ∗co(Π
∗);
1: Initialization (assign the value dSk,Dk to the link weights
for any potential pair of transmitter Sk and receiver Dk);
2: Find a shortest path in terms of the link weights be-
tween source node and destination node. The distributed
Bellman-Ford algorithm can be applied for this procedure;
3: Assign the shortest path to Π∗;
4: Apply Formula (18) to allocate the corresponding trans-
mission power P SO-COPSk for each transmitter on path Π
∗;
5: Apply Formula (19) to calculate the secure-based optimal
COP P ∗co(Π
∗) of path Π∗;
6: return {Π∗, P SO-COPSk , P ∗co(Π∗)};
B. Routing Algorithm for QO-SOP
We then consider the routing algorithm for QO-SOP. Based
on Formula (32), the routing problem of finding the optimal
path which achieves the minimum SOP under the QoS con-
straint can be expressed as:
min
Π∈S(Π)
1− exp

 λEπ
ln(1− βco)
(
γC
γE
) 2
α
(∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk
)2.
(42)
Then (42) is equivalent to
min
Π∈S(Π)
∑
lk∈Π
dSk,Dk . (43)
Expression (43) indicates that the routing problem for QO-
SOP is also equivalent to finding the shortest path connecting
the pair of source and destination nodes. Thus, we also apply
the distributed Bellman-Ford algorithm to find the shortest path
Π∗, and then allocate the transmission power of each node on
path Π∗ (except the destination) based on Formula (31). The
details of routing algorithm for QO-SOP are summarized in
Algorithm 2.
Regarding the implementation of the proposed routing al-
gorithms for SO-COP and QO-SOP in a practical ad hoc
network, our proposals could be incorporated in some existing
distance vector routing protocols, either the proactive ones
like M-DART [50] or the reactive ones like AODV [51]. The
main difference between the two types of routings is that
proactive routings establish and maintain routes proactively
(periodically), while reactive routings construct and update
routes only when needed (in an on-demand manner). There-
fore, they should be applied based on network features, such
as node mobility, delay requirement, etc. For example, for an
ad hoc network with slow mobility and requires low delay, it is
more appropriate for us to incorporate our proposals in proac-
tive distance vector routing protocols, where the distributed
Algorithm 2 Routing algorithm for QO-SOP.
Input: Network parameters {λJ , λE , γC , γE , PJ¯ , α} and
QoS constraint βco;
Output: The optimal path Π∗ for QO-SOP, the correspond-
ing transmission power PQO-SOPSk , the achievable SOP
P ∗so(Π
∗);
1: Initialization (assign the value dSk,Dk to the link weights
for any potential pair of transmitter Sk and receiver Dk);
2: Find a shortest path in terms of the link weights be-
tween source node and destination node. The distributed
Bellman-Ford algorithm can be applied for this procedure;
3: Assign the shortest path to Π∗;
4: Apply Formula (31) to allocate the corresponding trans-
mission power PQO-SOPSk for each transmitter on path Π
∗;
5: Apply Formula (32) to calculate the QoS-based optimal
SOP P ∗so(Π
∗) of path Π∗;
6: return {Π∗, PQO-SOPSk , P ∗so(Π∗)};
Bellman-Ford algorithm can be applied to find the shortest
path, and the dynamic addressing techniques in [50] can be
utilized to reduce routing overhead. For an ad hoc network
with fast mobility and can tolerate large delay, the reactive
protocols could be more efficient for the implementation of
our proposals. To deal with the fast topology changes caused
by node mobility, route is established (i.e., finding the shortest
path and allocating transmission power) in an on-demand
manner. AODV is a variant of Bellman-Ford distance vector
routing protocol, in which our proposals could be incorporated
to achieve optimal security-QoS tradeoffs.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we first present the Monte Carlo [52] simula-
tion results to validate our theoretical analysis for the outage
probabilities in a concerned multi-hop ad hoc network, and
then apply our theoretical results to illustrate the performance
tradeoffs and the corresponding routing algorithms.
A. Simulation Settings
We simulate a multi-hop ad hoc network in a 2000× 2000
square area. The jammers (resp. eavesdroppers) are distributed
at random positions which follow the homogeneous PPP
with density λJ (resp. λE ). Regarding the basic network
parameters, we set PJ¯ = 1, γC = 1, γE = 1 and α = 4. In
each Monte Carlo simulation for COP and SOP, we consider
the example of a fixed path Π = 〈l1, . . . , l5〉 with five links,
where the transmission power PSk and the distance dSk,Dk of
each link are set to be the same, respectively. The duration of
each task of Monte Carlo simulation is set to 107 rounds, and
the simulated outage probability is given by
simulated outage probability = 100%× No
107
, (44)
where No denotes the number of times that the event of outage
occurs in each simulation.
910
−6
10
−5
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Jammer’s density, λJ
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
o
u
ta
g
e
p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
(%
)
Theoretical
Monte Carlo Simulation
dSk,Dk = 5, 4,3
Fig. 1. Performance validation of COP: Pco(Π) versus λJ under different
settings of dSk,Dk . K = 5, PSk = 1 and dSk,Dk = {3, 4, 5} for 1 ≤ k ≤
K , PJ¯ = 1, γC = 1, α = 4.
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Fig. 2. Performance validation of SOP: Pso(Π) versus λE under different
settings of λJ . K = 5, PSk = 1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ K , λJ = {10
−3, 10−2},
PJ¯ = 1, γE = 1, α = 4.
B. Validation for COP and SOP
We first summarize in Fig. 1 the theoretical and simulation
results of COP performance, where we set PSk = 1 and
dSk,Dk = {3, 4, 5} for 1 ≤ k ≤ 5. The theoretical curves
are plotted according to Formula (3) while the simulated
results are obtained based on Formula (44). We can see
from Fig. 1 that the simulation results match nicely with
the theoretical ones for all the cases, which indicates that
our theoretical analysis is highly efficient in the evaluation
of end-to-end COP of multi-hop ad hoc networks. Another
observation of Fig. 1 is that as the jammer’s density λJ and/or
the transmission distance dSk,Dk increase, COP increases and
thus the communication QoS is degraded.
We then summarize in Fig. 2 the theoretical and simulation
results of SOP performance, where we set PSk = 1 for
1 ≤ k ≤ 5, and λJ = {10−3, 10−2}. The theoretical curves
are plotted according to Formula (9) while the simulated
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Fig. 3. COP-SOP tradeoff with the variation of transmission power. K = 5,
for the points from left to right on each curve, PSk takes the value from the
set {0, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2} sequentially, λJ =
10−3, λE = 10
−3, γC = 1, γE = 1, PJ¯ = 1, α = 4.
results are obtained based on Formula (44). Similar to Fig. 1,
Fig. 2 shows that the simulation results match well with the
theoretical ones for all the cases, which indicates that our
theoretical analysis is highly efficient in the evaluation of
end-to-end SOP of multi-hop ad hoc networks. We can also
see from Fig. 2 that SOP increases (thus the transmission
security degrades) monotonically as the eavesdropper’s density
λE increases, while increasing the jammer’s density λJ will
lead to a decrease in SOP, indicating that the jammers can be
utilized cooperatively to improve the security performance.
C. Performance Tradeoffs
We show in Fig. 3 the COP-SOP tradeoff with the vari-
ation of transmission power, where λJ = 10
−3, λE =
10−3, and we consider a path Π with five links (i.e.,
K = 5), each of which has the same distance and same
power. For the points from left to right on each curve of
Fig. 3, the transmission power PSk takes the value from
the set {0, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2} se-
quentially. We can see from Fig. 3 that as PSk increases, SOP
increases while COP decreases, indicating that the tradeoffs
between transmission security and communication QoS can
be achieved by controlling the transmission power. A further
careful observation of Fig. 3 is that for the same SOP
(for example, Pso = 50%), the minimum dSk,Dk can lead
to the minimum COP (Pco is 64%, 83% and 94% under
dSk,Dk = {3, 4, 5}, respectively), which indicates that a
shorter transmission distance can lead to a better performance
tradeoff.
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Fig. 4. Performance of SO-COP and QO-SOP. K = 5, dSk,Dk = 5 for
1 ≤ k ≤ K , PJ¯ = 1, γC = 1, γE = 1, α = 4.
We summarize in Fig. 4 the performance of SO-COP
and QO-SOP, where we set K = 5 and dSk,Dk = 5 for
1 ≤ k ≤ K . It is worth noting that the expressions of
P ∗co(Π) and P
∗
so(Π) are almost the same, except that βco in
(19) is replaced by βso in (32). Thus, we plot Fig. 4(a) to
show how P ∗co(Π) varies with βso and how P
∗
so(Π) varies
with βco, simultaneously. We can see from Fig. 4(a) that
as βso (resp. βco) increases, which means the constraint on
SOP (resp. COP) declines, P ∗co(Π) (resp. P
∗
so(Π)) decreases
monotonically. Another observation about Fig. 4(a) is that a
big gap exists between the curves under λE = 10
−4 and
λE = 10
−3, which indicates the eavesdropper’s density has
a great impact on the network performance.
Fig. 4(b) shows how the transmission power P SO-COPSk to
achieve SO-COP varies with βso, and Fig. 4(c) shows how
the transmission power PQO-SOPSk to achieve QO-SOP varies
with βco. We can see that P
SO-COP
Sk
increases monotonically
as βso increases, while P
QO-SOP
Sk
decreases monotonically as
βco increases. Moreover, Fig. 4(b) indicates that to deal with
the network scenario with denser eavesdroppers, for example,
increasing λE from 10
−4 to 10−3, we should diminish the
transmission power; while Fig. 4(c) indicates that to deal
with the network scenario with denser jammers, for example,
increasing λJ from 10
−4 to 10−3, we should increase the
transmission power.
Since we set the distance of each link on path Π is the same
in Fig. 4, the corresponding transmission power of each link
is also the same. To further illustrate the performance under
the network scenario with different link length, we consider
a path Π which consists of five links, the distance of each
link is uniformly distributed on (1, 10). We set λJ = 10
−3,
λE = 10
−4, βso = 0.5 and βco = 0.5, and the results of one
implementation are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
THE TRANSMISSION POWER OF EACH LINK AND THE OPTIMAL OUTAGE
PROBABILITIES.
The kth link 1 2 3 4 5
dSk,Dk 3.5726 7.8148 7.7836 4.4240 6.1104
P SO-COP
Sk
1.7147 8.2046 8.1391 2.6294 5.0160
P
QO-SOP
Sk
0.5708 2.7314 2.7097 0.8754 1.6699
P ∗co(Π), P
∗
so(Π) 0.3269
D. Routing Performance
To illustrate the routing algorithms for SO-COP and QO-
SOP, we focus on a 20×20 square area and randomly place 20
legitimate nodes following the uniform distribution. We assign
the node which is closest to the lower left corner as the source,
and assign the node which is closest to the upper right corner
as the destination. Notice that the eavesdroppers and jammers
are still randomly distributed over the whole network area, and
we set the densities as λE = 10
−4 and λJ = 10−3. In order
to ensure the end-to-end transmission is formed by multiple
hops, we strategically set the maximal transmission range of
a single hop as 8.
We plot in Fig. 5 a snapshot of the optimal path for SO-
COP and QO-SOP. For the snapshot of network scenario in
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Fig. 5. A snapshot of the optimal path for SO-COP and QO-SOP. The optimal
path Π∗ connecting the source and destination are plotted by the black solid
line with “⋆”, and other legitimate nodes are plotted by red empty circles.
Fig. 5, the optimal path Π∗ with the shortest path length is
selected by executing the Bellman-Ford algorithm. Based on
the distance of each link on path Π∗, our proposed routing
algorithms allocate the transmission power for each link to
achieve the optimal performance tradeoffs. Here we set both
βso and βco as 0.4, then the optimal achievable COP and SOP,
as well as the corresponding transmission power of each link
are summarized in Table II.
TABLE II
LINK LENGTH, TRANSMISSION POWER AND OPTIMAL OUTAGE
PROBABILITIES OF THE OPTIMAL PATH Π∗ .
The kth link 1 2 3 4 5
dSk,Dk 6.6027 4.6456 5.9676 4.7477 5.3562
P SO-COP
Sk
3.7608 1.8617 3.0721 1.9444 2.4748
P
QO-SOP
Sk
3.0366 1.5033 2.4806 1.5700 1.9983
P ∗co(Π
∗), P ∗so(Π
∗) 0.3681
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studied the physical layer security-aware routing
and the performance tradeoffs between transmission secu-
rity and communication QoS in multi-hop ad hoc networks.
Considering a multi-hop ad hoc network which consists of
randomly distributed legitimate nodes, cooperative jammers
and malicious eavesdroppers, we first derived the closed-form
expressions of COP and SOP for a given path. Then, we
analyzed the security-QoS tradeoffs to obtain the minimum
achievable COP (resp. SOP) with a guaranteed SOP (resp.
COP) and the corresponding strategies of power allocation
for each transmitter on the path. With the help of theoretical
analysis of a given path, we finally proposed the Bellman-Ford
based routing algorithms to find the optimal path between any
pair of source and destination nodes which can achieve the
optimal security-QoS tradeoffs.
Notice that this work is based on the interference-limited
assumption and didn’t consider the combining techniques at
the eavesdroppers, so one promising future direction is to
extend our study to the more realistic scenarios with the
considerations of additive noises and combining techniques.
Another appealing future work is to explore the physical layer
security-aware routing in a more general ad hoc network where
jammers have different transmission power.
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